Cyber warfare and autonomous self-defence by Grimal, Francis & Sundaram, Jae
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal on the Use of 
Force and International Law on June 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com.” 
  1 
CYBER WARFARE AND AUTONOMOUS SELF-DEFENCE 
 
Francis Grimal∗ and Jae Sundaram** 
 
The enemy will be different.... No longer will it be the simple 
terrorist armed with an AK-47 or the Semtex bomb (although he 
will still be around); the new threat will be groups who will bond in 
cyber space and attack using the new weapons of war: viruses, 
bugs, worms and logic bombs—James Adams, The Next World War: 




The last two decades have witnessed increased activity by states within 
the ‘fifth dimension’ (cyberspace) to conduct both civilian and military 
operations. It is now over two decades since Arquilla and Ronfeldt warned about 
the advent of cyber warfare in the foreseeable future, and cyberspace has now 
become a primary battlefield. Prevailing at the forefront of academic scrutiny 
within the jus ad bellum context is the extent to which cyber operations fall 
within the paradigm of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. A traditional 
and restrictive interpretation of the cornerstone prohibition contained in Article 
2(4) would conclude that the type of force (either threatened or actual) would 
need to be military / kinetic, thus potentially excluding the possibility of cyber 
activities. Naturally, some states would contest that it is the consequence 
suffered rather than the modality of attack.  
In turn, this raises issues as to whether or not the injury suffered by a 
state subjected to a cyber attack would be sufficient to invoke its inherent right 
of self-defence. The scope of this article is to consider the natural technological 
trajectory of self-defence in cyber operations by examining the very real 
possibility that computer networks may be enabled to eventually seek to 
automatically defend themselves against more aggressive cyber intrusions—
‘automated cyber self-defence’.  This would therefore necessitate an examination 
of the way and extent to which such actions would fall within the existing 
framework regulating a defensive response.  More controversially, the article will 
also assert that the temporal parameters of self-defence in response to a cyber 
attack may need re-calibration—issues of detection (particularly against 
dormant malware etc.) and attribution would prevent a state from responding in 
a more conventional timeframe.  Would self-defence therefore be permissible or 
indeed desirable several months after an attack has occurred if it is only then 
attribution becomes clear?  
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A cyber attack carried out against a military establishment is capable of  
devastating a state’s defences, or indeed severely limiting a state’s abilities to 
develop its military capabilities.1 Equally, cyber operations against key 
institutional infrastructures have the ability to paralyze the day-to-day 
operations of a state. The increasing number of cyber attacks on state 
institutions2 and military establishments have witnessed modern states seeking 
to build a robust cyber-defence mechanism to thwart potential attacks.3  
Nevertheless, the nature and unique attributes of networked technology require 
additional work to clarify how the laws may apply to cyber self-defence and 
automated self-defence, when dealing with cyber attacks.4 Commentators such 
as Maogoto and Nguyen note that the ‘definitional boundaries remain blurred’ in 
the realm of cyber attacks, as international law provides no direct guidance as to 
when a cyber attack could rise to the level of an armed attack.5 This inevitably 
raises the question on the legality of any measures taken in self-defence, 
including automated self-defence, and anticipatory measures that may come to 
                                                 
1 The Stuxnet virus was allegedly used to thwart the attempts of Iranian government in pursuing 
its nuclear capabilities. The Stuxnet worm's resemblance to legitimate software, such as digital 
certificates, while using a self-launching programme, allowed its rapid, unobstructed distribution 
to make it appear trustworthy and later take control of the centrifuges in Natanz, Iran. See Jon 
R. Lindsay, ‘Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare’ (2013) 22(3) Security Studies 365-404. Also 
to be mentioned is the cyber attack on Georgia carried out in August 2008, just before Russian 
military forces entered its borders, which affected government websites, news outlets and even 
Georgia’s largest bank. This attack closely resembled the earlier attacks carried out in Estonia in 
2007. See Andrew M. Colarik and Lech Janczewski D.Eng, ‘Establishing Cyber Warfare 
Doctrine,’  (2012) 5(1) Journal of Strategic Security 31-48.  
2 In February 2016, a cyber attack was carried out on the national bank of Bangladesh 
(Bangladesh Bank), with the attackers managing to syphon out over US$80 million. See Serajul 
Quadir, ‘Malware Suspected in Bangladesh Bank Heist: Officials’ Reuters News, 11 March 2016, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-bangladesh-malware-idUSKCN0WD1EV> (accessed 
12 December 2016). 
3 See generally, Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare (O’Reilly Media, 2012) 161-77, where the 
author while examining the military doctrines of cyber warfare in the Russian Federation, 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USA, notes that over 120 nations are currently 
engaged in developing cyber warfare capabilities.  
4 White House Cyber Strategy (2011) 9; See Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge, 2013) 3, where the author notes that 
the experts were unanimous in their estimation that both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
apply to cyber operations. See also Reese Nguyen, ‘Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber 
Warfare’ (2013) California Law Review 1079-1130. The author opines that despite cyberspace 
being the new battlefield for nation-states in conflict, jus ad bellum provides little guidance about 
the legality of a cyber attack or when an attack could be viewed as an act of war justifying an 
armed response.  
5 See Jackson Maogoto, Technology and the Law on the Use of Force (Routledge Press, 2015), 12; 
(Nguyen n 4). See also statement of Keith Alexander, Nominee, Commander, U.S. Cyber 
Command, ‘There is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use of force, in or out 
of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations may assert different definitions, and may apply 
different thresholds for what constitutes a use of force.’ (2010) Armed Services, 110th Servs., 
111th Cong.  
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be taken to counter any potential cyber attacks.   
The structure of this article is set out as follows: Part II of this article will 
place this discussion within context by examining some of the key and most 
significant cyber operations to date—the main purpose of which, is to highlight 
the perennial difficulty of attribution when it comes to cyber warfare.  
Consequently, the Overview in Part II will avoid any ancillary discussion 
regarding IHL as that is outside the scope of this article. Meanwhile, Part III of 
the article will set out the groundwork and necessary framework within which, 
the concept of automated cyber self-defence, which, we wish to advance in Part 
IV can be grounded. Part IV of the article examines the unique key thesis of this 
piece, which, we wish to assert—namely, that the natural trajectory when it 
comes to cyber attacks is that the Computer Network Infrastructure (CNI) will 
seek to defend itself automatically against an attack and may even seek to 
anticipate / intercept such an attack.  Within the concluding observations, the 
authors will present the view that the analysis undertaken in Part IV while 
admittedly, is perhaps more of a theoretical view/exercise at this stage, but the 
very real possibility of automated responses is not far from reality.   
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
The following section (as noted in the introduction) will provide an 
overview of recent cyber operations/incursions and intrusions but more 
importantly, familiarise the reader with the applicable ‘technology’ so as to 
inform regarding the latter parts of this article.  Consequently, the lawfulness or 
not of such attacks/operations will not be scrutinised—such a task has already 
been undertaken in quite microscopic detail by others.6  Rather, the overview 
will highlight the major difficulties in terms of identifying the attacker and 
taking appropriate defensive ‘action’.    
     
A. Estonia and the Tallinn Data Siege 
 
One of the most popular and earliest methods of cyber attacks to emerge 
from the 1990s, was the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, whereby 
cyber attackers overwhelm servers (and bandwidth) by bombarding them with 
unusually heavy bursts of data, or traffic.7 This is achieved through the use of a 
network of compromised zombie computers,8 in which, the owners of 
                                                 
6 See, for example, James A Green, ‘The Regulation of Cyber Warfare under the Jus ad Bellum’ 
in James A Green (ed.), Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Analysis (Routledge, 2015), 96; 
Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2014); and Matthew C Waxman, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future 
of Article 2(4)’ (2011) 36 Yale Journal of International Law 421; Oona Hathaway, Rebecca 
Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue and Julia Spiegel ‘The Law of 
Cyber-Attack’ (2012) 100 California Law Review 817. 
7 See Susan W Brenner, Cyberthreats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State (Oxford, 
2009) 1. The goal of a DDoS attack is to make the use of the network impossible for users, both 
internal and external. See Jose Nazario, ‘Politically Motivated Denial of Service Attacks’ in 
Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers (eds), The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on 
Cyberwarfare (IOS Press, 2009) 163-164. 
8 Unsuspecting computers are taken over by software that subtly and invisibly infiltrates a 
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infrastructure will be oblivious to the fact that their equipment has been 
completely compromised, and taken over by bot networks (botnets).9  The botnets 
then become part of a network of slave computers.10 DDoS attacks are viewed by 
some as an extension of politics in the 21st century, as increasing number of 
attacks are carried out by both state and non-state actors on other states, 
groups, or political factions.11 It is to be noted that conclusive attribution of a 
DDoS attack can be extremely difficult,12 as attacks can stem from multiple 
sources, and highly complicated to trace.13 In most cyber attacks involving the 
use of malware, some form of backdoor payload is introduced, which can then be 
                                                                                                                                                       
computer. They are also referred to as ‘bots’ and are capable of taking over any computer, private 
or something used by an institution. See Nichollas Ianelli and Aaron Hackworth, ‘Botnets as a 
Vehicle for Online Crime,’ CERT Coordination Center, 1 December 2005, 
<https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/WhitePaper/2005_019_001_51249.pdf> (accessed 12 
December 2016). See also Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner and Peter Martini ‘Proactive Botnet 
Countermeasures: An Offensive Approach’ in Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers (eds), The 
Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyberwarfare (IOS Press, 2009) 211-225. The authors describe 
botnet as an alliance of interconnected computers infected with malicious software (a bot), which 
can be commanded by an operator and can typically be advised to harvest information such as 
license keys or banking data on compromised machines, or even launch DDoS attacks against a 
chosen target. 
9 Botnets would typically consist of Microsoft Windows machines belonging to small business or 
home-computers that are ill-secured to viruses. See Brian Krebs, ‘Bringing Botnets out of the 
Shadows,’ The Washington Post, 21 March 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/21/AR2006032100279.html> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
10 Brenner (n 7). See also ‘The Botnet Trackers,’ The Washington Post, 16 February 2006, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/16/AR2006021601388.html> 
(accessed 12 December 2016).  
11 Nazario (n 7). Toolkits developed in the 1990s to carry out DDoS attacks were quickly adapted 
for political targets. One of the earliest events include attacks on NATO computers in the former 
Yugoslavia in the late 1990’s, and the attacks carried out by Chinese hackers on US military 
sites in response to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in the former Yugoslavia by US fighter 
jets. In more recent times it has been reported that the US presidential election campaign groups 
of Hillary Clinton have suffered several data breaches, most probably carried out by Russian 
hackers. See Mark Hosenball, Joseph Menn and John Walcott, ‘Clinton Campaign Also Hacked 
in Attacks on Democrats,’ Reuters News, 29 July 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
cyber-democrats-investigation-exc-idUSKCN1092HK> (accessed 12 December 2016). It is now 
strongly believed that Russia tried to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential elections by hacking 
into the Democratic National Committee’s servers and Senator Hilary Clinton’s emails, and later 
releasing them to Wikileaks for publication. See, Eugene Kiely, ‘Trump, Russia and the US 
Election,’ The Wire, 8 December 2016, <http://www.factcheck.org/2016/12/trump-russia-u-s-
election/> (accessed 12 December 2016); Rebecca Shabad, ‘Obama, GOP Senators Call for Probe 
to Examine Russia’s Meddling in US Election,’ CBS News, 9 December 2016, 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-gop-senators-call-for-probe-to-examine-russias-meddling-
in-u-s-election/> (accessed 12 December 2016).  
12 Messages sent as part of a DDoS attack can enter the internet from any location. This renders 
it difficult to find the source of the attack by ISPs, and the source addresses assigned to packets 
as part of a packet flood can be falsified. See Paulo Shakarian, Jana Shakarian and Andrew Ruef 
(eds.) Introduction to Cyber-warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Newnes, 2013).  
13 Two complicating factors in the DDoS attack are, that the attacking computers will be 
numerous and will change over time, and also, the source addresses (IP addresses) of the 
attacking computers could be forged. See Subramani Rao & Sridhar Rao, ‘Denial of Service 
Attacks and Mitigation Techniques: Real Time Implementation with Detailed Analysis,’ This 
paper is from the SANS Institute Reading Room site, 11 September 2011, 
<https://uk.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/denial-service-attacks-mitigation-
techniques-real-time-implementation-detailed-analysi-33764> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
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used by the attacker to gain access to the infected computer at a later point in 
time,14 which again complicates matters further making attribution an 
extremely difficult task to achieve particularly. This is probably one of the key 
considerations that re-surfaces in latter discussions in Part IV.  
Estonia, a European Union and also a NATO Member State,15 came under 
a series of sustained digital attacks on 26 April 2007.  The attacks continued for 
over two weeks, covering various components of Estonia’s infrastructure, 
including state media and the financial sector.16 Needless to say the cyber 
attacks were in the form of DDoS attacks, and an investigation of the siege 
revealed that an estimated 1 million zombie computers were involved in carrying 
out the attacks, which was unprecedented at that time.17 By 29 April 2007, a 
flood of data had shut down the Estonian Parliament, the website of the prime 
minister, various ministers, and the government name and email servers, 
besides slowing down transactions of key financial institutions within the 
state.18 On 9 May (Victory Day), the attacks peaked, with attacks lasting for 10 
hours each, with a peak bandwidth utilization of 95bps.19  
What the cyber attacks clearly revealed, though was that NATO lacked 
‘both a coherent cyber doctrine and a comprehensive cyber strategy,’20 which 
effectively forced the alliance to reconsider its position and strategy to tackle the 
growing cyber threat to its member states.21 
 
B. Georgia Comes Under Sustained DDoS Attacks  
 
The data siege on Tallinn was just the beginning, as Georgia was soon to 
experience a tsunami of cyber attacks for a sustained period of time. In July 
2008, the DDoS attacks were carried out on Georgian President Mikheil 
                                                 
14 Heather A Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 89-90. The backdoor is a code which opens an undocumented access point to the 
compromised computer or system by bypassing the authentication and security protocols and 
allowing the computer for remote access. The malware then is used to recruit the unprotected 
computers to a network of compromised computers called botnets, which are then in turn used to 
carry out DDoS attacks.   
15 Estonia is one of the smallest NATO member states, where almost all personal activities such 
as banking to education is carried out online, which was also a reason for being targeted for cyber 
attacks. See Vincent Joubert, ‘Five Years After Estonia’s Cyber Attacks: Lessons Learned for 
NATO?’ NATO Defense College, Research Division (2012) No 76.   
16 Mark Lander and John Markoff, ‘Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in Estonia,’ The New 
York Times, 29 May 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?_r=0> 
(accessed 12 December 2016).  
17 Brenner (n 7). See also Lander and Markoff (n 16) where the authors note that Dutch 
authorities reportedly encountered 1.5 million botnets some years ago. 
18 Nazario (n 7) 166. The attackers used multiple attack methods, including the use of Russian 
language forums and blogs to spread tools (such as ping flood scripts). To coordinate their efforts, 
the attackers also recruited botnets into the effort to fire them at the same time. 
19 Most of the attacks measured in ATLAS died out after Victory Day, although reports from 
first-hand accounts within Estonia indicate that they continued for several weeks. See Jose 
Nazario, ‘Estonian DDoS Attacks – A summary to date,’ Arbor Networks, 17 May 2007, 
<https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-date/> 
(accessed 12 December 2016). 
20 Rex B. Hughes, ‘NATO and Cyber Defence’ (2009) 33 Atlantisch Perspectief.  
21 Joubert (n 15). 
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Saakashvili’s website, with a much more substantial wave of attacks to come on 
8 August.22 In early August, Georgia and Russia exchanged fire and Russian 
tanks entered Georgian territory, which was instantly followed by a large scale 
DDoS attacks on the key Georgian sites,23 including the websites of the 
president, various ministries, news agencies, and others.24  
Arbor Peakflow and other traffic monitors on the internet recorded a 
substantially larger peak size than the attacks carried out in Estonia in 2007.25 
Attempts to load the webpage of the President of Georgia during the attacks, 
from a number of North American vantage points, were not successful.26 
Analysts also noted that the DDoS attacks appeared to coincide with the Russian 
troops’ movements into South Ossetia, which was in response to Georgian 
military operations launched a day earlier in the region.27  
The most important observation to be made here, besides the strong 
political undertone of the cyber attacks, is the fact that for the first time in over 
a decade a military conflict and a cyber conflict coincided.28  The cyber attacks 
carried out on Georgia were relatively unsophisticated DDoS attacks, and 
website defacement, but carried out in a very sophisticated manner29 to achieve 
maximum results. The primary purpose of the cyber attacks was to lend support 
to the Russian military operations and to that end the cyber attacks were 
effective, as it also successfully impeded the Georgian government to deal with 
the Russian invasion by interfering with communications between the 
government and the public, besides disrupting the payment mechanisms of the 
financial institutions.30 There is no doubt that the attacks were well coordinated 
between the Russian military campaign and the cyber attackers, as immediately 
upon the Russian troops establishing their positions within Georgia, the cyber 
attack list was expanded to include many more government websites.31   
 
C. Stuxnet: The Landmark Cyber Attack 
 
                                                 
22 On 19 July 2008, an internet security firm reported DDoS attacks on the websites in Georgia. 
See Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kaestenberg ‘Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook’ (2009) 38 (4) 
Parameters 60-76. 
23 Many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the corresponding military operations, which 
leads one to conclude that there had to be close cooperation between people in Russian military 
and the civilian cyber attackers. The organizers of the cyber attacks should have had advance 
notice of the Russian military intentions. See ‘Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign 
Against Georgia in August 2008’ (2009) A US-CCU Special Report. 
24 Nazario (n 7) 167.  
25 The peak bandwidth recorded during the attacks was over 800 Mbps, and the attacks were 
much more intense. See Nazario (n 7) 167. 
26 Steven Adair, ‘The Website for the President of Georgia Under Attack - Politically Motivated?’ 
Shadowserver Foundation Calendar, 20 July 2008, 
<http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/20080720> (accessed 12 December 
2016).  
27 Korns and Kaestenberg (n 22). 
28 Nazario (n 7) 167. The author also notes a more recent Israel-Palestinian conflict where 
military action coincided with cyber attacks. 
29 US-CCU Special Report (n 23). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Some of the difficulties in determining the lawfulness of actions pursued 
in cyberspace applying the existing international legal framework were well 
illustrated in the incident involving the use of Stuxnet virus in 2010 to carry out 
a cyber attack.32 If the cyber attacks on Estonia and Georgia were carried with 
the help of botnets to disrupt state functions and to put pressure on the 
governments concerned, the Stuxnet virus attack was carried out with utmost 
precision to paralyse (and very nearly brought to a halt) a state sponsored 
nuclear programme. Stuxnet is probably the first computer virus known to be 
capable of targeting and destroying industrial systems such as nuclear facilities 
and power grids.33 The Stuxnet worm, a self-replicating computer virus, was 
used to target the computers used in Iran’s nuclear facility to take control of the 
centrifuges at Natanz, which resulted in the centrifuges spinning out of control 
and self-destruct.34  
The worm was designed to sabotage the nuclear programme that Iran was 
promoting at that time by targeting the industrial control systems (ICSs) of the 
nuclear facility,35 and eventually go on to disrupt the nuclear enrichment 
programme. The seeds for the attack were sown even around 2008, when the 
worm was first infected networks around the world, although causing no grate 
damage to most systems infected.36 Initially it was assumed the attacks on the 
nuclear facility had not been successful, but in the autumn of 2010, reports 
spread quickly about Iran's uranium enriching capabilities becoming 
                                                 
32 See Thomas M. Chen, ‘Stuxnet, the Real Start of Cyber Warfare? [Editor’s Note]’ (2010) 24 (6) 
IEEE Network 2-3; Nguyen (n 4). 
33 Jonathan Fildes, ‘Stuxnet Worm ‘Targeted High-Value Iranian Assets,’ BBC News, 23 
September 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018> (12 December 2016). See 
also Chen (n 32). The author notes that Stuxnet, which is highly selective of its targets, looks for 
a particular ‘programmable logic controller’ (PLC) in vulnerable computers, and appears to aim 
directly at controlling physical machinery. 
34 Thomas N Chen, ‘Cyberterrorism After Stuxnet’ (2014) Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA 
Strategic Studies Institute; Nguyen (n 4). Because of the ‘cyber attack’ Iran's uranium 
enrichment operations halted, resulting in an estimated several years of delay in the country's 
nuclear arms development program. See Lindsay (n 1). See also Andrew Colarik and Lech 
Janczewski, ‘Establishing Cyber Warfare Doctrine,’ (2012) 5(1) Journal of Strategic Security 31-
48; Aleksandr Matrosov, Eugene Rodionov, David Harley, and Juraj Malcho, ‘Stuxnet Under the 
Microscope,’ ESET LLC, Revision 1.31 (2011) 
<https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf> 
(accessed 12 December 2016); Paul Mueller and Babak Yadegari, ‘The Stuxnet Worm,’ 
Département des sciences de l’informatique, Université de l’Arizona, 2012, 
<https://www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/Teaching/466-
566/2014/Resources/presentations/2012/topic9-final/report.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
35 Sean Collins and Stephen McCombie, ‘Stuxnet: The Emergence of a New Cyber Weapon and 
Its Implications’ (2012) 7(1) Journal of Policing, Intelligence & Counter Terrorism 80-91. The 
authors also opine that nation states, terrorist groups, hacktivists and cyber criminals to achieve 
their own goals could use future versions of the virus, and that Stuxnet has started a new arms 
race, creating serious implications for the security of critical infrastructure worldwide. See also 
Chen (32). Stuxnet did raise the eyebrows of security researchers for three reasons, namely, its 
choice of target, level of sophistication, and implications for future malware. 
36 Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Nowlan, Perdue Spiegel (n 6). See also Chen (n 34). Although 
the primary target was the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran, the virus infected an estimated 50,000 
to 100,000 computers across Iran, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.  
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diminished.37 This incident went on to demonstrate how a cleverly carried out 
cyber attack with surgical precision38 was capable of causing more harm and 
damage than a mighty airstrike.  
The destructive potential of a carefully carried out cyber attack was well 
captured in the above incident, as it paralysed the Iranian nuclear facility 
without coming under a traditional kinetic attack. It left no doubts in the minds 
of the detractors/analysts that a cyber attack carried out with far less manpower 
than an aircraft was fully capable of causing more harm and destruction than an 
army could potentially cause.39 The Stuxnet virus was crafted to deliver a 
payload to a specific high-value target clearly designed to bring about real-world 
damage of ICSs.40  
The advent of Stuxnet besides revealing the sophistication required for a 
‘weaponized’ malware,41 has also challenged the popular assumptions prevalent 
at that time, i.e., that network defences will protect facilities from vulnerabilities 
in software applications.42 In Chen’s view, Stuxnet now has the attention of the 
world by promoting an arms race to develop both offensive and defensive cyber 
capabilities among nations and the underground.43 It will also not be an 
exaggeration to state that the incident involving Stuxnet came close to causing a 
serious human catastrophe, as the cyber attack was carried out on a high value 
target, viz., nuclear enrichment facility.44    
                                                 
37 Chen (n 32). See also ‘The Stuxnet Worm: A Cyber-Missile Aimed at Iran?’ The Economist, 
Babbage Blog, 24 September 2010, 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/stuxnet_worm> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
38 Mark Clayton, ‘Stuxnet Malware is ‘Weapon’ Out to Destroy…Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant?,’ 
(2010) 21 Christian Science Monitor. The author compares Stuxnet to ‘a precision, military-grade 
cyber missile’.  
39 Chen (n 34) 9. The author estimates the cost of creating the Stuxnet virus to run into millions 
of dollars, with the use of very substantial resources. The author also opines that Stuxnet has 
implications for the cost-benefit weights of potential future attacks.  
40 Chen (n 34) 8-9. See also Lindsay (n 1). The attack did not permanently derail Iran’s nuclear 
program, as enrichment recovered within a year, leading to concerns in 2012 that Israel or the 
US might launch airstrikes to address the problem.  
41 Chen (n 34) 5. 
42 Stuxnet changed a theoretical hypothesis into reality, and there is more likely to be a long-
term affect than a short-term one. See Chen (n 34) 9.  
43 (Chen 34) 9. See also Lindsay (n 1), where the author observes that the many now view 
Stuxnet as the harbinger of even more devastating attacks to come, and that even weaker states 
and political actors will be encouraged to acquire cyber capabilities, posing a threat to advanced 
industrial nations. 
44 See Con Coughlin, ‘Stuxnet Virus Attack: Russia Warns of ‘Iranian Chernobyl’’ The Telegraph, 
16 January 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8262853/Stuxnet-
virus-attack-Russia-warns-of-Iranian-Chernobyl.html> (accessed 12 December 2016). Dmitry 
Rogozin, the Russian Ambassador to NATO remarked ‘these mines could lead to a new 
Chernobyl’, meaning if the attack had gone wrong it would have led to a nuclear disaster, similar 
to the Chernobyl nuclear incident of 1986. See David Brunnstrom ‘Russia Says Stuxnet could 
Have caused New Chernobyl,” Reuters News, 26 January 2011, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-russia-idUSTRE70P6WS20110126> (accessed 12 
December 2016). Some have taken the position that the Stuxnet virus was limited in its 
destruction, and did not cause any fatalities. See also Andrew Futter, ‘Hacking the Bomb: 
Nuclear Weapons in Cyber Age’ International Studies Annual Conference, February 2015, 
<http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/politics/people/afutter/copy_of_AFutterHackingtheBombISAP
aper2015.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2016).   
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Stuxnet has the distinction of being the only historical case available for 
scrutiny.45 Whether the Stuxnet cyber attack on the Iranian nuclear facility was 
in self-defence and justifiable under IHL is highly debatable, as no single state 
has come forward to assume responsibility for the attack,46 or has Iran for that 
matter accused anyone of having disrupted its nuclear enrichment programme,47 
using cyber tactics.48  Again, the issue surrounding lawfulness of such a cyber 
attack on a nuclear facility is outside the remit of this article, as others have 
spent considerable care and attention on examining this particular point.49 
Rather, the more important questions for our current discussion are how a state 
can justify any self-defence measures taken in cyberspace to prevent a potential 
cyber strike, and or actively ‘anticipate’ a cyber strike and counter the same for 
that matter.  
On the flipside, one can also raise the questions of how a state could 
successfully defend against such strikes, and how can it carry out anticipatory 
cyber strikes50 on other states (or non-state actors) to thwart any such cyber 
attacks which it may come to perceive as being launched. This raises further 
questions, i.e. whether the above defensive strikes and anticipatory strikes can 
be in response to cyber threats, and in response to non-cyber but military 
threats.51 Defensive cyber strikes have the risk of striking the wrong targets and 
                                                 
45 Lindsay (n 1). 
46 Although no official announcement was made, it is widely believed that the cyber attack was 
carried out through a joint US-Israeli component of a broader US cyber campaign against Iran, 
code-named ‘Olympic Games’. See David E. Sanger, ‘Obama Order Sped Up Wave of 
Cyberattacks Against Iran,’ The New York Times, 1 June 2012, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-
against-iran.html?_r=0> (accessed 12 December 2016). See also generally Kim Zetter, 
Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (Crown 
Publishers, 2014). 
47 Such an admission would have inevitably put Iran in a spot, as it had all along maintained 
that its nuclear enrichment programme was for civilian purposes and denied that it was capable 
of producing weapons grade plutonium, and an admission on its true purport would have put the 
State in trouble with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). See Chen (n 43), where 
the author notes that the Iranian officials at the Bushehr nuclear plant categorically denied that 
the cyber attack caused any damage to their main systems at the nuclear facility. Though the 
officials appeared to admit to some staff PCs being infected, the two-month delay in bringing the 
reactor in line was clearly blamed on a leak in a storage pool for the plant’s fuel.  
48 Iranian officials were unsure as to what was causing the centrifuges in its nuclear enrichment 
facility to stall and crash. In short, they were oblivious to the fact that their facility had come 
under a powerful cyber attack.  
49 Green (n 6), Roscini (n 6), Waxman (n 6), Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Nowlan, Perdue and 
Spiegel (n 6), and Dinniss (n 14).  
50 See below discussions in Parts III and IV. See also Chen (n 34) 4. The author argues that the 
US policies can really address only the opportunities for terrorism (but not motive or means) by 
strengthening the defenses of critical infrastructures; Eric F. Mejia, ‘Act and Actor Attribution in 
Cyberspace, (2014) Strategic Studies Quarterly 114-132, 115. See also International Strategy for 
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in Networked World (Washington: White House, 
May 2011) 10, where the right of self-defence related to cyber attacks is stated as follows: ‘Right 
of Self-Defence: Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to 
self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace’. It is abundantly 
clear that the US has taken an affirmative position on the issue as it has become the prime 
target of cyber attacks in recent years.   
51 The widely-debated involvement of the US and Israel in the Stuxnet cyber attack makes one 
conclude that it was in response to a non-cyber threat. See Dinniss (n 14) 112-113.  Dinniss is of 
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could potentially run into rough weather, as attackers can compromise third 
party computers to use as intermediaries, or channels through anonymizing 
proxies that hide their Internet protocol (IP) address.52 Dinniss holds the view 
that Stuxnet, in sharp contrast to the DDoS attacks on Tallinn, and Georgia, 
resulted in the destruction of property, and would amount to the use of force, but 
the scale and effects of the attack do not appear to have sufficient gravity to 
amount to an armed attack.53  
 
D. Iranian Hackers and the Cyber Heist on Bangladesh Bank  
 
In stark contrast to the previous examples, more recent cyber operations 
by Iranian hackers and a Cyber Heist on a Bangladeshi Bank highlight the fact 
that such activities may not always necessarily involve a kinetic or forceful 
result. Consequently, this raises the more important question as to what 
response might be permissible by way of self-defence to actions falling short of 
activating a forceful defensive measure. 54 
In December 2015, it was reported that an Iranian hacktivist group had 
claimed responsibility for a cyber attack, which allegedly allowed it to gain 
access to the control system to a dam in New York.55 More worryingly, the 
hackers claimed that they had breached the security even as early as in 2013, 
                                                                                                                                                       
the view that it is unlikely that the UN Security Council would consider it necessary to authorize 
force against a computer network attack. However, when an ongoing series of attacks cannot be 
stopped by electronic means, it is within the Security Council’s purview to authorise force. 
Dinniss also refers to UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) aimed at Iran, which did not 
authorise any measures exceeding the scope of the resolution, and notes that had the measures 
decided on been taken under Article 42 (with its usual phraseology ‘all necessary means’), then 
the Stuxnet worm would have proved an efficient way to achieve one of the aims of the 
resolution, i.e., suspension of enrichment-related activities. This broader issue is revisited in 
general terms within Parts III and IV.    
52 Stuxnet used two stolen digital certificates and multiple zero-day exploits making it impossible 
to attribute the attack carried out to one single source. Chen (n 34) 4-5. The author also notes 
that the complete effects of a cyber attack may be concealed. For instance, if stealthy malware 
has been installed without detection, then attribution is difficult. See also Dinnis (n 14), where 
the author identifies the practice of IP spoofing which is widely used in cyber attacks using 
botnets, where the identity of the provider is concealed, making attribution difficult. This part is 
discussed further in Parts III and IV. 
53 Dinniss (n 14) 81-82. The author notes that the worm may have been responsible for Iran 
having to replace 1,000 of the 9,000 IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment 
facility. See also David Albright, Paul Brannan and Christina Walrond, ‘Stuxnet Malware and 
Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report’ (2011) Institute for Science and International 
Security 3.   
54 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without Cyber War’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 187, 204-205. 
55 See Danny Yadran, ‘Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013,’ The Wall Street 
Journal, 20 December 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-
dam-in-2013-1450662559> (accessed 12 December 2016). Officials feared that hackers had 
breached the systems at the Arthur R. Bowman Dam in Oregon, a 245-foot-tall earthen structure 
which irrigates local farm lands and also prevents flooding in Prineville, Oregon which has a 
population of 9,200. Eventually, it transpired that the hackers had breached the systems at the 
Bowman Avenue Dam, which is situated near the village of Rye Brook, New York. The dam in 
question is a 20-foot-tall concrete slab across Blind Brook, about 5 miles from Long Island Sound. 
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and were prepared to release such technical information to prove it.56 The 
hackers also claimed that they did not go public with their attack as there was a 
‘state-level warning’ not to go public. A report into the incident revealed that the 
hackers were able to access files (including usernames and passwords) six times 
between 22 August 2013 and 27 September 2013,57 proving the claims of the 
hackers. Though the breach was traceable to an Iranian group, it was not clear if 
the intrusion was condoned by the Iranian government.  
However, after a wait of 3 months, the US indicted seven Iranian hackers 
associated with the cyber attacks against key industries, including breaking into 
the computer system at a small dam in Rye, NY., and for attacking a US bank’s 
public websites from late 2011 through May 2013.58 Interestingly, one of the 
charges brought against the hackers include coordinated ‘distributed denial of 
services,’ or DDoS attacks with a view to crash the commercial sites of 46 US 
financial institutions.59 This indictment marks the first instance, where the US 
has charged state-sponsored individuals with hacking to disrupt the networks of 
key US industries, and it is highly unlikely that the Iranian government will be 
willing to send those indicted to the US to face trial.60 Although the US officials 
were able to complete the investigation more than a year ago, the indictment 
was held off so as not to jeopardize the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with Iran 
and a January prisoner swap.61    
In February 2016, a cyber attack was carried out on the national bank of 
Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank), with the attackers managing to syphon out 
US$81 million. The original plan of the hackers was to embezzle a sum of 
US$951 million from its Fed account, which it uses for international settlements, 
but only a typing error made by the hackers prevented the attempts of moving 
that big amount from the central bank.62 The key officials in the country were 
oblivious of the heist, and the Governor of the Bangladesh’s Central Bank quit as 
it emerged a sum of US$30 million, which was stolen from the Bangladesh Bank, 
was delivered in cash to a casino operator in Manila, Philippines.63 While the 
                                                 
56 Ibid. When the Wall Street Journal reported the breach in December 2015, SOBH Cyber Jihad 
decided to go public for the operation against the Bowman Avenue Dam in Rye Brook, NY. 
57 Ibid. Officials in Rye Brook could stress that the hackers did not ever manipulate the dam over 
Blind Brook. 
58 Ellen Nakashima & Matt Zapotosky, ‘National Security: U.S. Charges Iran-Linked Hackers 
with Targeting Banks, N.Y. Dam,’ The Washington Post, 24 March 2016, 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-
indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-
e9c95c06edca_story.html> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
59 Ibid. The affected institutions include Bank of America, the Nasdaq Composite Index, the NY 
Stock Exchange, Capital One, AT&T and PNC. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Dustin Volz and Jim Finkle, ‘US Indicts Iranians for Hacking Dozens of Banks, New York 
Dam,’ Reuters News, 24 March 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-cyber-
idUSKCN0WQ1JF> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
62 See Quadir (n 2). See also Serajul Quadir ‘How a Hacker’s Typo Helped Stop a Billion Dollar 
Bank Heist’ Reuters News, 10 March 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-
bangladesh-typo-insight-idUSKCN0WC0TC> (accessed 12 December 2016). There is no doubt 
that the cyber attack carried out on the Bangladesh Bank was not politically motivated but 
financially motivated. 
63 Serajul Quadir and Karen Lema, ‘Man in Manila Gets $30 Million Cash from Cyber Heist; 
Bangladesh Central Bank Governor Quits,’ Reuters News, 15 March 2016, 
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FBI is looking for evidence in the US and beyond to determine who was behind 
the daring cyber heist,64 the Bangladesh bank is weighing the options of bringing 
a court action against the NY Fed over the bank heist carried out through a 
cyber hack.65  
It is highly debatable if cyber attacks can be classified as use of force, as it 
will have to be studied on a case by case basis and any outcome will be largely 
predicated on any destruction of property, economic consequences brought about 
by such attacks, the players involved, the value and strategic importance of the 
targets, and the surrounding political and other circumstances prevailing at the 
time the attack is carried out. All the above factors play a major rule, and any 
uncertainty can make attribution an extremely difficult task. 
 




In order to evaluate autonomous cyber defensive actions taken by CNIs 
(contained in Part IV) at a theoretical/conceptual level, this present section will 
examine the applicable legal framework within which, such a discussion must be 
grounded. The first caveat with any such exploration is that this section will 
avoid placing too great an emphasis on overly deconstructing Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter in the context of cyber operations.  This area of the law 
has been extensively examined and re-examined in recent times.66   
However, the more important ‘discussion’ for the purview of this article 
lies in considering a state’s potential responses under Article 51 UN Charter. 
The law governing a state’s inherent right to self-defence traditionally, and to 
this day, continues to attract considerable forensic analysis.67 This article will 
avoid revisiting age-old debates, and instead focus within the specific parameters 
and remit of the article as set out in the abstract.   
Nevertheless, no discussion on cyber operations can completely avoid 
highlighting the perennial consideration as to whether Article 2(4) fully, or 
indeed, partly captures the subtleties of a cyber attack. Section B will therefore 
consider the applicable legal parameters surrounding Article 2(4), while Section 
                                                                                                                                                       
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-bangladesh-governor-idUSKCN0WH0JF> (accessed 
12 December 2016). 
64 Abhirup Roy and Nate Raymond, ‘FBI Probes Bangladesh Bank Account Cyber-Theft: WSJ’ 
Reuters News, 18 March 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-bangladesh-
idUSKCN0WK25L> (accessed 12 December 2016). 
65 Serajul Quadir, ‘Bangladesh Bank Weighs Lawsuit Against NY Fed Over Hack,’ Reuters News, 
22 March 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-bangladesh-idUSKCN0WO2JQ> 
(accessed 12 December 2016). 
66 See, for example, Green (n 6); Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, Nowlan, Perdue and Spiegel (n 
6); Dinnis (n 14) 37-74; Roscini (n 6); and Waxman (n 6). 
67 See, for example, as a minimum, Murray Colin Adler, The Inherent Right of Self-Defence in 
International Law (Springer, 2013); Kinga Tibori Szabó, Anticipatory Action in Self-Defence: 
Essence and Limits under International Law (TMC Asser Press, 2011); Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ 
and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); James A Green, The International Court of Justice and Self–Defence in 
International Law (Hart, 2009).  
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C will set out the necessary framework regarding a state’s inherent right of self-
defence.    
 
 
B. Deconstruction of Article 2(4) Pertinent to Cyber Operations 
 
The starting point for any discussion concerning jus ad bellum 
considerations requires underscoring the cardinal prohibition against both the 
threat or use of force by states contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.68 As 
some scholars are quick to caution, an overly liberal use of jus cogens 
categorisation is to be avoided,69 but overwhelmingly, the academic consensus is 
that the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) has jus cogens status, and 
accordingly, cannot be derogated from.70  It is important to underline, that it is 
not Article 2(4) per se that has jus cogens status, rather, it is the prohibition 
contained therein.71 In parallel to the ‘negative’ prohibition contained in Article 
2(4), runs a positive obligation contained in Article 2(3) UN Charter requiring 
Member States to settle their disputes peacefully. A holistic and combined effect 
of Article 2(3), Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) alongside the customary principle of 
non-intervention, is the general obligation against states to interfere within the 
sovereign affairs of another state.72 
As highlighted in the abstract, a traditional and undoubtedly restrictive 
interpretation of the cardinal prohibition contained in Article 2(4) would 
conclude that the typology of force (whether threatened or actual) would need to 
be of a military / kinetic nature thus potentially excluding the possibility of cyber 
activities.73  In sharp contrast of course, some states would contest that it is the 
consequence suffered rather than the modality of attack, which, would therefore 
allow cyber-operations to fall within the ambit of Article 2(4).74 Clearly, at the 
time in which, the Charter was being drafted and negotiated the use of such 
advanced technology was not envisaged.  Therefore, as many have highlighted, it 
                                                 
68 This is another area of the jus ad bellum which, remains under forensic scrutiny. See, for 
example, Olivier Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010), 50-197; Thomas M Franck, Recourse to Force: 
State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 11-9; and 
Nico Schrijver, ‘The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN Charter’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), 466. 
69 James A. Green,  'Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force' 
(2010) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 215. 
70 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
71 Green (n 69).  
72 Noting, that Treaties are interpreted according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). See also Grigoriĭ Ivanovich Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Wildy, 
Simmonds and Hill, 2003) 141.  
73 For that more traditional interpretation, see Daniel B Silver, ‘Computer Network Attack as a 
Use of Force under Article 2(4)’ (2002) 76 International Law Studies 73, 80-2; and Tom J Farer, 
‘Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law’ (1985) 79 American 
Journal of International Law 405. 
74 For a classic interpretation, see Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States (Clarendon Press, 1963), 362. 
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is up to the international legal community to re-evaluate the legal framework 
given that the latter has been ‘overtaken’ by advances in technology.75 
A point made by one of the authors of this Article in a co-authored Book 
Review (with Professor James A Green) elsewhere, is that an application of jus 
ad bellum created prior to the creation of modern technology will undoubtedly be 
problematic,76 as transposing and applying the existing tapestry to modern 
threats cannot be the solution.77 Some commentators however, over-play this 
trajectory.78 One could safely posit that while cyberspace is unique, it is not so 
unique so as to make the jus ad bellum inapplicable.79 It should not be forgotten 
that since its creation, the application of Charter Law has necessitated regular 
‘updates’ to contend with emerging threats.80 Charter laws have been adapted to 
threats posed in different dimensions, and cyberspace is yet another dimension 
within which, its application is sought. And finally, even if one does conclude 
that certain cyber operations may fall outside the purview of the jus ad bellum, it 
is patently incorrect to assert that these would also fall outside the scope of 
international law generally. Such operations would still be captured within the 
more general principles of non-intervention81 and/or the duty of due diligence.82 
While violations of these international norms do not trigger or allow for forcible 
actions in self-defence, states may still lawfully have recourse to non-forcible 
countermeasures.83 
By way of basic deconstruction of Article 2(4), the ICJ in Nicaragua 
employed a fairly liberal definition of ‘force’, which captures both direct and 
indirect use of force.84 Within the context of cyber operations, and specific to this 
article, one might also raise an interesting but perhaps niche point as to whether 
the mere ‘threat’ of cyber force would also fall within the purview of Article 2(4) 
in terms of constituting an unlawful threat of force?  This issue will be revisited 
in due course in Part IV particularly, since an autonomous response in self-
defence may be ‘anticipated’ against an imminent threat which, has yet to 
materialise into a ‘concrete’ armed attack. 
Considerable ink has already been spilt in terms of typology assessment 
regarding cyber attacks and the way in which, they may be captured (or not) 
                                                 
75 See, for example, Maogoto (n 5.).  
76 Francis Grimal and James A Green, ‘Technology and the Law on the Use of Force’ (2016) 3(1) 




80 See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace’ 
(2013) 89 International Legal Studies 123, 123-4; and Christopher P M Waters, ‘New Hacktivists 
and the Old Concept of Levée en Masse’ (2014) 37 Dalhouse Law Journal 771, 773-5. 
81 See Russel Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions’ (2012) 
17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 212, 212-13. 
82 See James A. Green, ‘Disasters Caused in Cyberspace’ in Susan C Breau and Katja L H 
Samuel (eds), Research Handbook on Disasters and International Law (Edward Elgar, 
forthcoming 2016); and Michael N Schmitt, ‘In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace’ (2015) 
125 Yale Law Journal Forum 68. 
83 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without Cyber War’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 187, 204-205. 
84 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
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within the remit of Article 2(4).85 To revisit those in considerable detail would 
undoubtedly detract from the more important discussion regarding autonomous 
responses. Therefore, the authors propose to confine themselves to highlighting 
Matthew Sklerov’s work regarding cyber attack assessment rather than delving 
further into already well documented analysis.86 It should be added that Sklerov 
himself draws heavily on Michael Schmitt’s seminal works on cyber attacks.87  
Broadly speaking, Sklerov sets out three categories / approaches, while 
contemplating any defensive strategy in response to a cyber attack.88  First, is 
what he deems as an ‘instrument-based approach’—this questions whether the 
damage caused (in this case by cyber operations) could only have been previously 
achieved by kinetic means.89 Secondly, is what Sklerov refers to as an effects or 
consequence based approach—as its name suggests the means or mode of attack 
is irrelevant and of greater importance is the effect suffered by the victim state.90 
Finally, is a strict liability approach whereby all cyber attacks against CNIs are 
treated as armed attacks because of the severe nature of the consequences that 
ensue.91  
It is highly tempting to take the view that the second and third 
approaches are fairly similar in substance. However, and as Sklerov himself 
concludes, one can therefore take the view that no matter which model is used, 
cyber attacks can constitute an armed attack.92 This is perhaps somewhat 
simplistic and as Green would quickly point out, one must recognise whether a 
cyber-attack does (or can) constitute an instance of ‘force’, ‘intervention’ and/or 
an ‘armed attack’ – differing concepts requiring different thresholds.93 For the 
purposes of this article, perhaps the conclusion needed to be reached sooner 
rather than later is simply that cyber-attacks with non-kinetic results may 
qualify as a use of force and trigger the armed attack threshold thereby allowing 
a state to lawfully respond in self-defence.94  
 
                                                 
85 In particular, see for example, Green (n 6) at 98-107. In addition, to Matthew J Sklerov, 
‘Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active 
Defenses against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent’ (2009) 201 Military Law Review 1, 
particularly at 54-5, Michael N Schmitt ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’ (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 885. See also Roscini (n 6), Waxman (n 6), Hathaway, Crootof, Levitz, Nix, 
Nowlan, Perdue and Spiegel (n 6), and Dinniss (n 14).  
86 Sklerov (n 85) 54-55.  
87 Schmitt (n 85). 





93 James A Green, The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law 
(Hart, 2009), 31-3.  
94 See, for example, Jack Goldsmith, ‘How Cyber Changes the Laws of War’ (2013) 24 European 
Journal of International Law 129, 133; Vida M Antolin-Jenkins, ‘Defining the Parameters of 
Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?’ (2005) 51 Naval Law Review 
132, 155; and Stephanie G Handler, ‘New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a Legal Approach to 
Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare’ (2012) 48 Stanford Journal of International Law 
209, 229. See also Dinnis (n 14) 81, who takes the view, while referring to cyber attacks on 
Estonia and Georgia, that the attacks do not go beyond the equivalent of a frontier incident. 
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C. Self-Defence Applicable to Cyber Operations 
 
While the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter remains absolute, there exist two, well known ‘exceptions’ to this default 
position: self-defence and collective security. Since the focus of this article is 
entirely on the former in terms of automated self-defence, the present discussion 
will not entertain any foray into collective security.  Given the considerable 
wealth of commentary already dedicated to both visiting and revisiting a state’s 
inherent right to invoke self-defence under customary international law, such 
discussions will be similarly avoided.  
The law governing a state’s inherent right of self-defence fuses pre-
existing Charter Law in the form of International Custom and Article 51 of the 
UN Charter.95 Article 51 is explicitly in is requirement that state must have 
suffered an ‘armed attack’ (or at the very least be faced with a sufficiently 
serious and imminent threat of suffering an armed attack).96  Neverthelss, the 
text of Article 51 provides no guidance to the term of art, ‘armed attack’ and its 
applicable threshold.  Instead, further explanation is distilled from the ICJ’s 
judgment in the Nicaragua case97 and from commentators alike, to mean that an 
armed attack should be defined as: ‘the most grave form of the use of force’—a 
qualitatively grave use of force—beyond a use of force simpliciter.98   
Once a state has suffered an armed attack, the lawfulness of its response is 
regulated by the two key parameters: necessity and proportionality. The origins 
of necessity and proportionality were espoused in the seminal correspondence 
between the then US Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and his British 
counterpart Lord Ashburton with regards to and forming part of the Caroline 
incident.99 Daniel Webster’s formulation required that in order for a state to 
lawfully invoke self-defence it would need to: 
 
‘[S]how a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it 
to show, also, that . . . [it] did nothing unreasonable or excessive; 
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be 
limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.’ 
 
                                                 
95 James A. Green and Francis Grimal, ‘The Threat of Force as an Action in Self-Defense Under 
International law’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 285-329, at 299. 
96 Don W. Greig, ‘Self Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require? (1991) 
40(02) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 366-402. NB: Article 51 of the UN Charter 
remains silent as to imminence.  
97 Nicaragua (n 84).  
98 Green & Grimal (n 95) p 300, Avra Constantinou, The Right of Self-Defence Under Customary 
International Law and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Doctoral Dissertation, 
University of Nottingham, 1996).   
99 Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry S. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 British and Foreign State 
Papers (1841-42), 1129-39 (1857). 
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The principles of necessity and proportionality; both of which are 
intertwined, are distilled from the Webster formulation.100 Deriving from the 
Webster formulation / Caroline formula, the modern interpretation of necessity 
dictates and questions whether it was reasonable to use force as a last resort 
and, if non-forcible measures were a reasonable alternative in the circumstances, 
that they were explored/exhausted—a measure therefore of last resort.101 The 
proportionality meanwhile, requirement dictates that the “force employed must 
not be excessive with regard to the goal of abating or repelling the attack”.102 
Green and Grimal both remark that a state’s response need not actually mirror 
the initial attack, numerically speaking. If state A fires 10 missiles at state B, 
then state B is not obliged under the concept of proportionality to respond with a 
volley of 10 identical missiles.103  
At this juncture, it is important to distinguish the lawfulness of a 
defending state’s action taken during an on-going armed attack–the so called 
‘cumulative effect’, as phrased by Garwood-Gowers,104 and instances where force 
is used once the armed attack has ceased. In the context of the former (an on-
going armed attack), according to Green, the position is that the responding 
State is placed under a temporal restriction—there must be a reasonable 
temporal proximity between the victim State’s response and the armed attack 
itself.105 Undeniably, and Green himself is the first to concede and highlight  
that the  ‘reasonableness’ parameter is somewhat nebulous and imprecise.106 
Accordingly, green suggests this area is open to interpretation along the lines of 
‘a context-specific appraisal of the various factors that may delay a self-defence 
action: intelligence gathering, initial resort to negotiation, geographical 
disparity, and so on’.107  The authors of this present article are of the view that 
an ‘overly tardy’ response may negate the necessity requirement—the longer a 
state waits before responding, the more difficult it is to reconcile with the ‘last 
                                                 
100 Green & Grimal (n 95). See generally James A. Green ‘Docking the Caroline: Understanding 
the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-
Defence’ (2006) 14 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 429.  
101 D Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum,’ 
European Journal of International Law Vol 24 No. 1 (2013) 235-282.  J Gardham, Necessity, 
Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press 2004); S Etezazian, 
‘The Nature of the Self-Defence Proportionality Requirement,’ Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law (2016) 1-30; See also T Christodoulidou and K Chainoglou, ‘The Prnciple of 
Proportionality From a Jus Ad Bellum Perspective,’ in Marc Weller (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
The Use of Force in International Law (Oxford Publishing 2015). Green & Grimal (n 95The ). 
102 See Constantinou (n 98) 159-61; Gamal Moursi Badr, ‘The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense 
in State Responsibility’ (1980) 10 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 1; David 
Kretzmer, ‘Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence?’ (2005) 16(2) European Journal of International Law 171-212. 
103 Green & Grimal (n 95) 301. See Judge Higgins’s Dissenting Opinion, in Advisory Opinion 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at para 5. See also 
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Bellum’ (2013) 24(1) European Journal of International Law 235-282.  
104 See generally Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Self-Defence Against Terrorism in the Post-9/11 
World’ (2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 1. 
105 See James A. Green ‘The Ratione Temporis Elements of Self-Defence’ (2015) 2(1) Journal on 
the Use of Force and International Law 97-118. 
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid. 
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resort’ criteria required for the necessity element.  Therefore, an overly tardy 
response may render the action unlawful.  
Undeniably, there is also a strong case to be made that a state’s response 
to a cyber attack (which, may amount to an actual ‘armed attack’) could be via 
measures falling short and not giving rise to an actual use of force.108   This also 
leaves open the more problematic question as to what typology of reaction is 
envisaged against a cyberattack (providing it meets the armed attack threshold)?  
Different typologies of response could of course encompass a more traditional 
‘kinetic reaction’, or a reaction in cyberspace falling short of a grave use of 
force.109  Both of which, may be just as effective in the strategic sense of abating 
the initial attack / strike.110  In the case of the latter, one would also need to 
consider the availability of ‘countermeasures’ or other applicable defences within 
the context of precluding wrongfulness such as necessity, distress or force-
majeure—the advantage of which, is that the perennial problem of attribution is 
thus negated.111  However, the present authors are of the view that while such 
responses falling short of actual force may well be desirable in terms of 
justification (of a lawful response), the non-forceful element may not be sufficient 
to abate or repel a further attack.  
From a proportionality perspective, clearly certain questions require 
further investigation.  First, if a state is invoking its inherent right of self-
defence, would the response need to be limited to that of a cyber nature or could 
it also be kinetic?  Under a strict interpretation of proportionality, one could 
argue that the means of response actually alters very little.  The consideration 
would still be whether the response be it cyber or kinetic does not exceed the 
defensive necessity of abating or repelling a further attack.  Certain scenarios 
may invite one or other responses from a strategic perspective but in terms of 
application, there is nothing inherently wrong with leaving the door ajar for 
both. More controversial however, is to whom the response is directed against 
rather than the mode.  Would for example the response need to be targeted 
against a state’s cyber capabilities rather than its other military assets?  Or, 
would a cyber attack by zombie computers ‘invite’ a lawful and proportionate 
response of destroying innocent civilian computers so as to thwart the attack?  
Undeniably, the latter runs the risk of exceeding the careful framework required 
in order to maintain a proportionate response of abating or repelling a further 
attack—another reason why automated responses have inherent deficiencies.  
  
D. The Case for Re-Calibration of Temporal Limits112 
  
                                                 
108 The authors are grateful to Professor Dr Tom Ruys for his helpful contribution and suggestion 
on this point.  
109 Ibid.  Since this issue has been dealt with elsewhere within the literature by Dinniss (n 14), 
this article confines itself to exploring its original remit and will as such, not delve further into 
the typology. 
110 Ibid. Ruys (n108).  
111 Ibid. 
112 N.B. Some of views expressed in this section follow a similar trajectory to those expressed by 
Grimal in his article: ‘Missile Defence Shields: Automated and Anticipatory Self-Defence?’ (2014) 
19(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 317-339. 
  19 
While the actual cyber attack may take place within nano-seconds, any 
lawful self-defence action can ensue once attribution has been established.  In 
other words, the temporal space for a self-defence action against a cyber attack 
should be extended to allow for attribution to be completed to the satisfaction of 
the defending state. Self-defence against a traditional strike platform places the 
responding state under a temporal restriction requiring a reasonable temporal 
proximity between the victim State’s response and the armed attack itself. 
Unlike a response against a conventional attack, a response in self-defence to a 
cyber attack after a lapse of twelve to eighteen months cannot categorically be 
ruled out due to difficulties in detection and attribution of the attack to a 
particular state.  
However, the necessity element is therefore also being stretched—the 
greater the time lapse between attack and response, the more it affects the 
state’s ability to fulfil the necessity requirement of self-defence.  For example, it 
is more difficult for a state to argue that it is acting out of last resort, that it has 
exhausted all non-forceful measures, and that it will be wholly unreasonable to 
expect a non-forceful response.  It can be argued that an immediate response 
could be ruled out and any self-defence response can only take place after a clear 
determination of the attribution of act and actor.113  This may take months to 
achieve, or may not even be possible to achieve for a long period of time thereby 
making any self-defence action purposeless.  Understandably, whilst this 
conceptual recalibration may be desirable, the practical consequences may not 
be. This leaves open the possibility for abuse by taking a legitimate action in self-
defence and turning it into an unlawful reprisal.  
In a traditional armed/kinetic attack, there is certainly the notion that to 
a limited degree, states can extend ‘their response in self-defence beyond the 
moment where the attack being responded to terminated’.114 For the reasons 
stated above the response time available for a state which has come under a 
cyber attack will have to be stretched, or recalibrated to give space to the 
affected state. In certain instances, a state may not even be aware it has come 
under a cyber attack.115 Green and Garwood-Gowers postulate (independently) 
that when a state comes under a kinetic attack there exists a ‘dual’ or 
‘cumulative effect’ argument whereby that state not only needs to respond to the 
previous attack but be guarded against a future attack.116 This ‘dual’ or 
‘cumulative effect’ alluded to by Green and Garwood-Gowers may have to be 
tweaked to first look at beefing up the defences from any future attacks while 
one investigates the source, origin, and key players to the attack for purposes of 
attribution, as any reprisals without clear attribution of act and actor is bound to 
backfire and be counter productive.117 The investigation could also take a 
lengthy period requiring the recalibration of the temporal limits to complete any 
investigation before devising a suitable response.    
                                                 
113 See chapter IV for a detailed discussion on attribution. 
114 Ibid. And, as helpfully signposted by the anonymous reviewer, this would cover ‘Crimea-type’ 
scenarios whereby the ‘defending state’ has since been occupied.  
115 See for instance, the incident involving Stuxnet, where Iran was not aware that it had come 
under a cyber attack, and continued to address the problem differently.  
116 Ibid. See also Garwood-Gowers (n 105).  
117 Motives and attribution are discussed in part IV of this article.  
  20 
While discussing the possibility of establishing a framework for automatic 
self-defence in cyberspace, it is imperative to look at some of the arguments 
arising under anticipatory self-defence under traditional kinetic warfare. Since 
the ICJ’s refusal to reject the possibility of anticipatory self-defence in the 
Nicaragua Case, anticipatory self-defence has remained highly controversial 
amongst academics and states alike.118 Here, the controversy hinges on the 
lawfulness of a forcible response against an imminent threat of force rather than 
an actual use of force.119  
Taking action against a mere threat of force is doubly problematic: 
previous cyber attacks have invariably been perpetrated via non-state actors 
(with state backing—hard to prove), hacktivists and others.  The examples 
referred to in part II clearly demonstrate that states were unable to gauge an 
‘imminent threat of cyber attack/imminent cyber threat’ beforehand to be able to 
respond by force of any kind. In the absence of a clear cut attribution, it may be 
an extremely difficult task to respond to a threatened cyber attack.  At this 
juncture, one can state that the same arguments available to a state which faces 
an imminent threat of force (kinetic) in order to exercise a forcible response may 
not be available to a state which fears an imminent cyber attack. This is because 
it is an extremely difficult task to pin point with accuracy the origin of a cyber 
attack /perpetrator of the attack with absolute certainty with the current level of 
technical expertise at our disposal.  
If we are to take the position that self-defence against any attack, whether 
kinetic or cyber, will have to strictly meet the parameters of international 
law/Charter Law, it will then require a discussion of armed attack as understood 
under the provisions of Article 51. Would a state need to have suffered an ‘armed 
attack’ as understood under the language of Article 51, or could it rely upon the 
customary position set out by the Caroline formula—enabling a state to lawfully 
use anticipatory force against an imminent cyber threat?120 Debate also 
surrounds the terminology used by scholars.121 The position taken by this author 
                                                 
118 Nicaragua (n 84). See Green & Grimal (n 95) 287. See also Jackson N. Maogoto, Battling 
Terrorism: Legal Perspectives On The Use Of Force And The War On Terror (Ashgate Publishers, 
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119 Ibid. 
120 Green (n 100) 463-73.  
121 Christine D Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press 3rd ed. 
2008) 211-212.  
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both here and elsewhere is that anticipatory self-defence refers to action taken in 
response to an imminent threat; pre-emptive self-defence, meanwhile, is action 
taken against a latent and temporally remote threat.122 The major hurdle in 
trying to adapt the customary position of international law, i.e., Caroline formula 
to a situation where a state fears an imminent threat of a cyber attack is not 
knowing who the attacker is and what is being sought to be targeted. In simple 
terms anticipatory self-defence follows the wording of the Caroline formula—a 
state must respond to a threat which leaves “no moment for deliberation”.123  
This principle may not sit comfortably to support an action in anticipatory 
self-defence where a cyber attack is seen as imminent, as it may be extremely 
difficult to demonstrate that the cyber threat leaves very little time to deliberate 
and one needs to strike in self-defence. Here, a perceived imminent cyber attack 
appears to be a remote argument as in a traditional kinetic attack a state would 
not only know its enemies and allies, but also their capabilities and possible 
movements through surveillance, etc., before deciding to act. 
   
In Nicaragua, the ICJ adopted the following position:  
 
[I]n the circumstances of the dispute now before the Court, what is in 
issue is the purported exercise by the United States of a right of collective 
self-defence in response to an armed attack on another State. The possible 
lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of an armed attack which 
has not yet taken place has not been raised.  
 
According to Gill the logical interpretation of the ICJ’s pronouncement is 
that for anticipatory action to be lawful it would have to be taken against a 
threatened armed attack.124 But, state practice meanwhile appears to be 
predicated purely on the concept of imminence.125 In essence, the threat posed 
                                                 
122 Green & Grimal (n 95). See Constantine Antonopoulos, ‘Force by Armed Groups as Armed 
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will need to be qualitatively grave (a threatened armed attack) and also 
imminent in order for self-defence to be lawfully invoked,126 by the state pleading 
the case of imminence. Pre-emptive self-defence on the other hand, stretches the 
‘elasticity’ of imminence to breaking point,127 which is well captured in the ‘Bush 
Doctrine’ in the United State National Security Strategy 2002, where the US 
effectively removed the imminence requirement, i.e., action will be taken against 
a latent threat that may or may not materialise at some indeterminate point in 
the future.128 Under Bush Doctrine, any pre-emptive self-defence action taken 
will be seen as being perfectly lawful—a proposition rejected by states and 
scholars alike.129   
Dinstein’s discussion of a hypothetical attack by American Forces against the 
Japanese fleet, so as, to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, 
and his concept of interceptive self-defence are of particular relevance to our 
discussions,130 as it presents a scenario where the temporal element of attack, 
                                                                                                                                                       
number of other states argued that the action was unlawful because self-defence against a threat 
is unlawful per se; for example, the Soviet Union referred to such actions as “the law of the 
jungle.” 
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preparedness and interceptive self-defence/response is carefully deconstructed. 
Within the modality of self-defence, Dinstein’s terminology of ‘interceptive self-
defence’ fully encapsulates the essence of the role of a CNI intercepting an on-
going attack—the ‘countering of an armed attack which is already in progress’.131 
When Dinstein’s notion of ‘interceptive self-defence’ is brought into the cyber 
realm to thwart any imminent cyber attack one encounters difficulties, most 
significant of which is with regard to the different temporal limits present in the 
two dimensions of warfare played out viz., an air attack and a cyber attack.   
  As regards an air strike is concerned, the mere target acquisition and 
‘locking on’ by a fighter jet could constitute an armed attack (albeit in progress), 
and according to Dinstein, a ‘timely response’ against the fighter jet would 
constitute interceptive self-defence.132 Within the ‘fifth dimension’, one could 
analogise that the CNI has detected some abnormality in the data traffic and the 
CNI consequently automatically ‘intercepts’ a potential cyber attack. Unlike a 
missile-defence shield that intercepts a missile that is already programmed with 
a payload and whose launch is undeniably imminent, the point of interception is 
much less clear cut.  
Whereas with the cyber interception, such activity or interception is taking 
place within considerably shorter temporal limits (nano seconds) and also in 
cyber-space—a battlefield which, is much less tangible. When data packets are 
fired in the battlefield terrain of computer networks, aiming to breach secure 
internet protocols, they assume a different time frame to that of a conventional 
battlefield, where bullets and missiles are fired in real space against real targets.  
It is well known that botnets (zombie computers) are extensively used in 
cyber attacks, and the uneven spatial distribution of infected computers across 
the internet, specifically on a limited number of ‘unclean’ or ‘zombie-friendly’ 
networks pose a major problem.133 Botnets, which could be ‘turned into digital 
weapons,’134 are normally located in different jurisdictions and connected to 
different servers and internet providers. Most worryingly, the botnets studied 
over a period of time demonstrated an impressive attack capability, and further, 
like real-world armies, they were capable of coordinating their efforts with other 
botnets.135 
One should note that much of Dinstein’s discussion of Pearl Harbour relies 
implicitly on an imminent threat in terms of affecting the lawfulness of his 
                                                 
131 Ibid, 204. 
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133 The authors are again grateful to Professor Dr Tom Ruys for his suggested inclusion of the 
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hypothetical scenario.136 He then envisages 3 types of hypothetical scenarios,137 
which are as follows: 
 
1) The shooting down of a Japanese Type 99 Carrier Bomber just prior to it 
attacking Pearl Harbour. The Bomber would have left the carrier and 
would be inbound and poised to drop its ordnance.  According to Dinstein, 
such an attack would be lawful—once the aircraft have been launched 
from the carrier, there can be no doubt that an armed attack is underway 
and that the other side has  “committed itself to an armed attack in an 
ostensibly irrevocable way”.138 
2) The sinking of the Japanese Fleet prior to the launch of any aircraft 
poised to attack on the US’s Pacific Naval Base and Pearl Harbour. This is 
much more problematic and as Dinstein concedes, lawfulness would hinge 
on real time concrete data visibly demonstrating that Pearl Harbour 
would be subjected to an imminent attack; reminiscent perhaps of 
satisfying the ‘Caroline criteria’.   
3) An attack by the US against the Japanese fleet prior to it setting sail or 
during war gaming manoeuvres. This is very much along the pre-emptive 
lines and as Dinstein rightly concludes, would be undeniably unlawful.   
 
Therefore, under the Dinstein sense or ‘necessity’, a reasonable interpretation of 
interception would be along the Caroline incident lines.139   
When one takes a closer look at the three possible actions presented by 
Dinstein to thwart an impending air attack (modelled on the Pearl Harbour 
strike), it becomes clear that firstly, there is unequivocal information about the 
attacker, the mode of attack and the weapons used, and sufficient time to 
intercept/press into service one of the three possible actions presented.   
Concretely, in cyber attacks there is much less room for manoeuvre in terms of 
timings because the detection of such an attack is much more problematic. 
Unlike missiles which, are in the ‘free flight phase’ or ideally at the ‘boost phase’ 
(noting that it is difficult to determine exact trajectory in this phase), it is much 
more difficult to ascertain both the point of origin and the source of the attack in 
the cyber attack in the cyber realm. For both missile interception and a cyber 
response, interception would probably fall within the realm of necessity.  
However, for the necessity threshold to be triggered in the cyber realm one 
would have to conclude (in a very compressed timeframe) that the system is 
indeed under attack and that there are no alternatives available in order to 
defend the system.  In other words, a state is acting anticipatorily—something 
that the Court in Nicaragua did not dismiss outright in paragraph 35 and, of 
course, if one accepts a more general right of anticipatory self-defence under 
international law.140 A response under those set of circumstances against a 
considerable surge in data would arguably fall within the necessity 
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requirement. A cyber attack is carried out using data streams (which the 
internet is based on), and any unusual data surge need not necessarily 
indicate/translate into an impending cyber attack. Importantly, the data stream 
is used to carry all forms of computer network attacks, which vary widely,141 and 
could also be manipulated to mask or hide the origin of the stream and hence the 
attacker to thwart any detection. This aspect will be further discussed in part IV 
under motives and attribution.   
 
 
IV. AUTONOMOUS SELF-DEFENCE IN CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
As noted in the introduction, the authors wish to introduce and explore the novel 
concept of automated self-defence in the cyber realm as a means of explicating an 
action which, is ‘machine guided’, that is, devoid of human involvement and 
hence ‘automatic’. The programming of any machine (to this day at least) is 
undertaken by human beings. However, the cause for concern with regards to 
automated self-defence is that the ‘machine is calling the shots’ (sic)—the lack of 
human control is concerning for the application of these criteria. NATO has 
defined Computer Network Defence as ‘Actions taken through the use of 
computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to 
unauthorized activity within information systems and computer networks’.142 The 
above definition can be used as a working model to develop an argument for an 
automated Cyber Defence Shield (CDS). The definition limits/presupposes that 
any defensive activities to be through the use of computer networks to counter 
any unauthorized activity within the cyber realm.  
The purpose of this section is to study in greater detail the threshold of 
response, that is to say, against which types of actions or threats are automated 
responses calibrated to? The format for analysis in this section is as follows: Part 
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A will provide an overview in terms of threats of force. This is central to the 
argument because to unravel the nature of the automated response it is 
necessary to understand what the CDS is responding to in terms of its 
calibration.  
Is it a threat of force or an actual use of force? Can there be a threat of 
force in cyber space, as in the case of an air strike or missile strike? Is the system 
at large to be viewed as the target of such a cyber threat, as opposed to a specific 
target in conventional warfare? The second of the questions is raised here due to 
the peculiar landscape of cyber space where internet serves as the medium 
through which not only information is exchanged through data streams but also 
most of the activities of the state (both military and civil) are conducted,143 
making it a most desired target for an attack.  
The instances of cyber attacks studied under part II encapsulates the 
different ways in which an attack could be carried out on both civil and military 
targets. Part B will explore whether, and to what extent, the response by a CDS 
fits within the threshold of necessity and proportionality.  
 
A. Threats of Force 
 
Before proceeding to define and consider threats of force, it is helpful to 
draw on Dinstein’s Pearl Harbour scenario by way of explanation – especially to 
scenarios 2 and 3.  To recall, scenario 2 discussed the sinking of the Japanese 
Fleet prior to the launch of any aircraft poised to attack the US’s Pacific Naval 
Base and Pearl Harbour. Scenario 3 envisaged an attack by the US against the 
Japanese fleet prior to it setting sail or during war gaming manoeuvres. Taking 
a slightly more controversial line, one can argue that ‘interception’ (to use 
Dinstein’s terminology), in both scenarios could also be predicated on a response 
to a threatened cyber attack144 and not an actual cyber attack, and thus in CDS 
terms may affect the way in which any interception operates.  
Conceivably, ‘interception’ in scenario 2 could be against an imminent 
grave threat of cyber attack rather than an ‘actual cyber attack’ (something 
Dinstein appears to implicitly allude to—the authors of this article transpose 
into the cyber realm). Here, there is no reference as in scenario 1 for the US ‘to 
regard the Japanese armed attack as having commenced’.145 As mentioned 
earlier, one should still take into consideration the temporal recalibration that is 
required to apply these principles to the cyber realm, as the response time will 
be severely limited when one talks about interception in the cyber realm. Also 
once the attack has commenced there is little or no time to intercept, as things 
happen in a nano-second in the cyber realm. 
                                                 
143 The internet has moved from being a platform to access and exchange information while still 
it was in its infancy in the latter part of the twentieth century, to a realm to conduct day-to-day 
affairs (civil and military) in the twenty first century. In current day terms, the more a society 
could do on the internet, the more modern it is as a state. Simply put, a modern state is fully 
‘wired’. 
144 Where patterns of data exchanged, peculiar data surges, etc. originating from a certain region 
strongly indicates that it is highly likely that state A was intending to carry out a cyber attack, 
and state B is constrained to consider its response options, including the use of the CDS. 
145 Dinstein (n 130) 203. 
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Scenario 3 appears in threat terminology at least to be against a non-
imminent and latent. It is important not to overplay this discussion vis-à-vis 
threats, imminent threats, etc., but in order to fully understand the lawfulness of 
actions taken by a CDS one must be mindful as to how threats operate in order 
to appreciate that interception against a non-imminent latent threat, as opposed 
to an actual cyber attack may yield very different results in terms of both 
necessity and proportionality.     
It is important to note that threats of force remain a nebulous concept 
under international law. Although they are prohibited, they still remain 
undefined by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,146 which runs as 
follows:   
 
‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.’ 
 
The prohibition against the threat of force has also been restated in the form of 
soft law declarations in 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly relations and Cooperation Among States and the 1987 
Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of 
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations.147 
 
                                                 
146 UN Charter Article 2, para 4.  See Green & Grimal (n 95); See also Dino Kritsiotis, ‘Close 
Encounters of a Sovereign Kind’ (2009) 20(2) European Journal of International Law 299-330. It 
is generally accepted that the prohibition of the use of force is also universally binding under 
customary international law. See for example, Michael Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-
Emptive Force’ (2003) 14(2) European Journal of International Law 227-240, 228 where the 
author observes that the ‘…prohibition of the use of force is a valid norm of customary 
international law...’; Hermann Mosler, ‘The International Society as a Legal Community’ 
(BRILL, 1974) 140 Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 283. Whether 
this is also true for the prohibition of the threat of force is debatable given the lack of clear 
articulation of the prohibition in state practice. It is also generally agreed in the literature that 
the prohibition of the use of force is a jus cogens norm (a peremptory norm of international law 
from which no derogation is possible). See for example, Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory 
Norms In International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 50, where it is noted that the 
‘…prohibition of the use of force by States undoubtedly forms part of jus cogens’. Some scholars 
have taken this further and argued that the prohibition of the threat of force is similarly a jus 
cogens norm. However, for the suggestion that the prohibition does exist in custom, see Nicholas 
Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge Press, 2007) 92–126. The 
observes that it is ‘…safe to conclude that article 2(4) of the UN Charter is jus cogens as a whole, 
without distinction to be made between the threat of force and the actual use of force’. However, 
it is our view that the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force is in fact debatable, 
and the prohibition of the threat of force is certainly not peremptory. See generally James A. 
Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2010) 32 
Michigan Journal of International Law 215 (regarding the peremptory status of the prohibition 
of the use of force); ibid at 225–29 (specifically regarding the peremptory status of the prohibition 
of the threat of force).  
147 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the 
Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, U.N. Doc. A/42/22/766 (18 
November 1987). 
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Commentators have posited that a threat may take a different guise—not 
necessarily something said but also something done albeit the archetypal threat 
remains a coded warning / ultimatum—comply or else.148 For the purposes of the 
current investigation, the typology of threat is limited – if one were to accept 
that anticipatory self-defence is lawful, then the threat being responded to in 
self-defence must be a threatened armed attack, and moreover, the threatened 
armed attack must be imminent – such as a missile launch.149 As Gill 
commenting on the judgment of ICJ in the Nicaragua case observes that there 
‘can be no doubt that an armed attack, or at any rate the threat of an armed 
attack, is an absolute precondition for the exercise of the right of self-defence’.150     
The authors of this article maintain that a full assessment of a threat of 
force cannot be conducted without reference to strategic considerations. Strategic 
considerations help explain the practical distinction between an empty threat—
made by a state that does not possess the means of carrying it out (which may 
well violate Article 2(4) but is ‘tolerated’) and a threat that is all too ‘real’. Under 
traditional kinetic warfare, the threatening state is militarily capable of carrying 
out its threat, and the threat itself is both unlawful under Article 2(4) and 
intolerable in the eyes of the international community. The authors of this 
article maintain the view that recourse to Schelling’s model set out in ‘Arms and 
Influence’ forms the basis of understanding the severity of a threat—particularly 
in terms of military appraisal, and helps clarify whether it is a grave threat of 
force.151  
In order for the threat to be considered real/serious, the threatening state 
must possess the capability in terms of military platforms and strike force to 
deliver the payload. Also, that state needs to communicate its intention to its 
enemy that it will carry out the threat, and that threat must be credible. Within 
the context of CDS, the strategic considerations would considerably differ, as 
military capability and cyber capability do not equate—while the first of the two 
is more tangible and hence measurable, the second is not so tangible and hence 
not measurable. Clearly, a state that would have fired a missile, would have 
ticked all of the relevant boxes, but maybe not in the case of a cyber threat. 
In terms of assessing the lawfulness of a threat of force (kinetic or 
otherwise), the present test under international law is the one put forward by 
the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.152 Broadly-speaking, the test 
poses a retroactive test to the hypothetical question – if the threat of force were 
                                                 
148 See Francis Grimal, Threats of Force: International Law and Strategy (Routledge, 2012). In 
particular refer to chapter 2, where it is posited that approaches range from categorisation and 
placing threats on a scale ranging from the innocuous to the extreme to examining the very 
purpose of the threat. For example, can non-verbal actions such as engaging in military exercises 
near another state’s border fall within the remit of 2(4)? Or, is 2(4) solely concerned with verbal 
ultimata demanding compliance? 
149 Green & Grimal (n 95).  
150 Gill (124). 
151 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (Yale University 
Press 2008).  
152 Internationaler Gerichtshof, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion’ (1996) ICJ Reports 226-593; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). See the Introduction and Grimal (n 154) note Chapters 2 
and 4.  
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carried out (in other words, if actual force and not threatened force were to be 
used), would it be lawful? If yes, then this would legitimise the prior threat. If 
not, if actual force would be deemed unlawful, then so would the threat that 
precedes it.  
The question that needs to be posed for the current study is can the above 
template fit the requirement of response to an imminent cyber attack? A second 
question will be, can a state threaten another sovereign state with a cyber 
attack? The dangers of such an action can be multifold, as it could expose the 
cyber capabilities of the state posing the threat, if the threat of force is 
unjustified, then any future legitimate actions may not find support amongst the 
international community, or the Security Council for that matter. It will also 
become an easy suspect for any cyber attacks that may come to be carried out 
around the world.  A cursory look at the scenario may present a negative answer, 
but a closer look and a more refined analysis may present a different view on the 
question. 
 




     CNI                                                                                                           Launch 
                        
-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------- 
        |              |                                      |                                                           | 
        |              |                                      |                                                           | 
DS |________|_____________________|_________________________________| AS 
      AA                                                  TCA                                                     NACA                
 
Fig 1: Perceived attack in cyber space showing ‘interception points’ in AS, TCA, 
and NACA from right to left.  
 
The above diagram is used to help theorise the point at which an 
automated cyber response may take place and if such a response would fall 
within the cardinal requirements of necessity and proportionality. Several 
primary observations need to be made noting Haussler’s distinction between 
(artillery) rockets and missiles (whether guided or otherwise),153 and a cyber 
attack, where the target is a whole network as opposed to a specific target in real 
world terms.154 Mid course or ‘free flight phase’ is denotes that a rocket or 
missile is not, or is no longer, guided at some point during its flight.155  There are 
also technological constraints as to when interception may take place in different 
realms. Successful interception is more likely during the free flight or re-entry 
                                                 
153 Francis Grimal, ‘Missile Defence Shields: Automated and Anticipatory Self-Defence?’ (2014) 
19(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 317-339. 
154 This aspect of the cyber realm is introduced into the argument here, as there is a real 
difference in terms of time and space between the two sets of warzones/battlefields compared, 
viz., geographical landscape plus atmosphere, and cyberspace/ cyberscape.     
155 Grimal (n 153). ‘Free flight phase’ was normally used specifically for ballistic missiles, namely, 
in order to differentiate between the boost, free flight, and re-entry phases.  
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phases of ballistic missiles due to the time factor and speed.156 Whereas the 
same cannot be said about a cyber attack in cyber space, as the free flight or re-
entry phases are absent in cyber space, and also there are no equivalents that 
could be possibly analogised.   
 
a) NACA No Actual Armed Attack: No necessity and proportionality—any 
action from DS (Defending State) will be unlawful. 
 
In this context, the conclusion adopted, is that since a state has yet to suffer a 
cyber operation amounting to an actual ‘armed attack’, it is difficult to content 
that the necessity and proportionality elements have been satisfactorily met.  
The responding CDS / state arguably would not be fulfilling the ‘last resort’ 
requirement of necessity since it would have other options at its disposal.  
Similarly, since proportionality is intrinsically predicated on a response being 
proportionate to the defensive necessity of abating or repelling an attack, the fact 
that no such attack has occurred, renders the proportionality requirement 
somewhat moot.   
 
b) TCA (Threatened Cyber Attack): Automated interception is unlawful 
unless the state can claim an action falling within anticipatory self-
defence. Attribution is problematic against a TCA which, may allow 
defensive blocking falling short of a forceful response in the absence of the 
necessity and proportionality criteria being met. 
 
A CDS / state acting against a threatened cyber attack will potentially struggle 
to meet the necessity and proportionality requirements.  Although the CDS / 
state is potentially ‘conscious’ of threatened cyber attack, it may be impossible to 
discern or attribute the source of that attack.  Consequently, this lack of 
attribution renders it difficult or perhaps nigh impossible to satisfy either of the 
necessity and proportionality elements at least in the practical sense.  While the 
state may be in ‘survival, last resort mode’, it cannot practically resort to 
anything unless and until it has identified its attacker otherwise, the response 
will be disproportionate—the ‘interception’ may end up attacking innocent 
states.    
 
c) Actual Armed Attack: The closest one gets to impact the more likely 
automated is lawful – presumably attribution more likely detectable. More 
probable. Necessity and proportionality possible providing attribution is 
possible. 
 
This scenario is more easily reconciled within the traditional self-defence 
paradigm.  Providing a CDS / state can pinpoint its attacker, the response is 
theoretically (at least) capable of meeting the necessity and proportionality 
threshold requirements.  The cyber defence shield can presumably discern its 
attacker and then ascertain whether it has other options at its disposal and 
                                                 
156 Grimal (n 153). 
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indeed (again, theoretically) calibrate its response accordingly to abating or 





Much of the difficulty with applying the jus ad bellum to cyber-attacks 
concerns attribution (notably, because using proxy servers to hide the original IP 
address can comparatively easily mask the author of a cyber-attack).157  Nazario 
observes that in the above cases of Estonia and Georgia (and a few other cases), 
from a political perspective classic right-wing sentiments are apparently behind 
the attacks, and it is noticeable that attackers use DDoS attacks to express 
support for an official government position, either against external or internal 
foes, besides also causing the victim some punitive damage to register their 
dissent with the victim’s actions.158  
In Nazario’s view attribution continues to ‘be a significant challenge in 
this problem space when retaliatory measures are considered,’ and the attacks 
can spiral into significant diplomatic incidents if great care is not taken.159 In 
both cases identified, circumstantial evidence appear to point in the direction of 
non-state players carrying out the cyber attacks, strongly backed by a state 
player, sharing a common agenda, but yet the same may not be sufficient to 
launch any offensive against the state player.  
Maogoto’s view, technological advances in warfare have ‘overtaken’ the 
international legal framework, which, he asserts, is now ill-equipped to regulate 
both aggressive cyber operations and attacks in/from outer space.  For example, 
in relation to the right of self-defence, Maogoto argues (17) that the injury 
suffered by a state by virtue of intrusions into ‘the digital commons’ will likely 
not be sufficient to trigger Article 51: an attack that merely corrupts or ‘annoys’ 
rather than destroys would, in his view, fall short of a qualitatively grave use of 
force triggering a defensive response.160 The fear is that this may leave states 
with no defensive recourse in response to technological threats.161  
By way of overall conclusion, the authors of this article take the view that 
a) while automated and anticipatory self-defence is certainly strategically 
desirable, advancing such a legal argument remains problematic—at best an 
                                                 
157 See P W Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to 
Know (Oxford University Press, 2014) 75. 
158 Nazario (n 7) 172. See also Dorothy Denning, ‘Activism, Hactivism, and Cyberterrorism: The 
Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy’ in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds) 
Networks and Netwars (RAND, 2001) 239-288. The author presents a broad definition of 
cyberterrorism in the following terms: ‘…politically motivated hacking operations intended to 
cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage’. This definition almost touches 
upon most aspects under discussion in the instances under discussion, but whether the cyber 
attacks in question can be branded as ‘cyber terrorism’ is moot.    
159 Nazario (n 7) 174. 
160 This is the prevailing view in the literature.  See, for example, Harrison Dinniss (n 1) 81.  
However, for a contrary position, see Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Cyber-Attacks, Self-Defence and the 
Problem of Attribution’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 229, particularly at 231-2. 
161 See, for example, Matthew C Waxman, ‘Self-Defensive Force against Cyber Attacks: Legal, 
Strategic and Political Dimensions’ (2013) 89 International Legal Studies 109 (echoing this 
concern). 
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automated response in self-defence would have to be of a blocking nature,162 and 
b) a theoretical/conceptual stretching of the temporal considerations is again 
desirable but an overly elastic interpretation is very much open to abuse. Unlike 
its IHL counterpart in the form of the Tallinn Manual, the jus ad bellum as this 
article as this article as sought to suggest it remains an area needing further 










                                                 
162 We are grateful to Dr Duncan Hodges for offering his views on the issue.   
